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1 While the flow of Cubans to the United States dates back to the 19th Century (Poyo G.,
1989), it is widely recognized that the contemporary Cuban presence in the United States
is linked to the conditions created by the Revolution of 1959 and the geopolitics of the
Cold War. Whereas previous migrations established communities in New York, Tampa
and Key West,  the post-1959 Revolution migration created in Miami-Dade County the
largest Cuban diaspora population in the country. Almost half of the 2 million Cuban
Americans in the United States live in Miami-Dade County. Most are post 1959 migrants
(Lopez M.H. and J.M. Krogstad, 2014). 
2  Because  of  its  anti-Revolutionary  origins,  it  is  often assumed that  the  community’s
sociocultural and political characteristics are monolithic. That is, all Cubans in the United
States are viewed as being made of the same anti/counter Revolutionary cloth, fiercely
loyal  to the Republican Party and supportive of  U.S.  policies  which delegitimize and
isolate the Cuban government. This monolithic view of the Cuban émigré is particularly
directed at the Cubans living in the Miami-Dade metropolitan area. As Figures 1 and 2
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make clear, Cubans are the dominant Latino group in Miami-Dade County. These Cuban
Americans  are  frequently  characterized  by  their  monolithic  ideological  “right  wing”
leanings. This “Exile Ideology” shapes the national perception of the nature of the Cuban
American community (Perez L., 1992; Grenier G. and L. Perez, 2003). To the degree that
non-Cuban  Americans  think  of  Cubans  in  the  Miami  area,  they  are  frequently
characterized by their political features: staunch anti-Castrism, militancy and political
conservatism (Uhlander C. and F.C. Garcia, 2005). 
 
Figure 1: Ethnic Make Up of Miami Dade County: 2010 Census
U.S. Census 2010
 
Figure 2: Latino Origin Population: Percent of Total Population (2% or more)
U.S. Census, 2010
3 Yet,  in  recent  decades  the  Cuban  community  has  grown  increasingly  diverse,
ideologically and economically. Since the Mariel Boatlift in 1980 and, more recently, since
the regularization of immigration brought about by the 1995 Immigration Agreement,
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which instituted the “wet foot/dry foot policy, and the changes in Cuban migration policy
of  January  2013,  the  Cuban  population  of  Miami  has  developed  socioeconomic  and
political characteristics unlike the earlier arrivals (Fernandez G., 2007; Newby C.A. and J.
A. Dowling, 2007; Portes A. and A. Puhrmann, 2015). The diversification of ideological
perspectives among Cubans is evident in the shrinking allegiance to the Republican Party.
From the high of 70% percent in the 1990s to an estimated minority of 46% of Cubans in
Miami  Dade  are  registered  Republicans  (Grenier  G.  and  H.  Gladwin,  2014).  The
diversification of the Cuban community can be observed across a wide range of attitudes
and has contributed to the creation of a socio/political profile of the Cuban American
community that is more aligned to the State and national Latino realities.
4 The existence of a diversity of political attitudes within the Cuban American community
based on time of arrival in the United States has been well established in the literature
(Grenier G., and L. Perez, 2003; Eckstein S. and L. Barberia, 2002, Eckstein S., 2009; Girard
C. and G. Grenier, 2008; Girard C. et. al. 2010; Girard C. et al. 2012). The waves of departure
from Cuba have been associated to the variation of attitudes to the embargo (Girard C. et.
al,  2010),  Republican  Party  registration  (Girard  C.  and  G.  Grenier,  2012)  and  other
measures of Cuban American political attitudes specifically related to U.S./Cuba policy
(Grenier G.  and H.  Gladwin,  2014).  Much of  the empirical  evidence for the argument
supporting changing views comes from the FIU Cuba Poll, a poll which has tracked Cuban
American attitudes about U.S. Cuba policy since 1991. Since its inception, the FIU Cuba
Poll has measured the attitudes of Cuban Americans living in South Florida towards U.S./
Cuba relations. The standardization of key questions as well as the frequency of the poll
has allowed the understanding of the changing nature of Cubans in the United States,
particularly its growing ideological diversity. This paper analyzes data from the 1997 to
2016 FIU Cuba Poll to explore the diversification of views within the Cuban American
population in Miami-Dade County toward U.S./Cuba policies that encourage engagement
with or promote isolation of the island.
5 In this article, I will present data from the combined data set of the Cuba Poll from 1997
to 2016. After reviewing the methodology, and establishing the theoretical framework, I
will present the results of the key variables by poll year. This allows us to see change over
time in the attitudes of the entire Cuban American population in Miami-Dade County. To
view the changes by waves and generation, I will then present the data according to the
time of respondent departure from Cuba and whether the respondent was born in Cuba





6 Data for the present analysis are taken from a data set combining eight Cuba Polls, from
1997 to 2016 (Figure 3). Each survey was conducted among Cuban Americans in Miami
Dade County. The combined sample is comprised of 7731 valid respondents contacted via
telephone using standard random digit dialing procedures. The data have been weighted
to  be  representative  of  the  appropriate  demographic  characteristics  of  the  Cuban
American population during each poll year.
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Figure 3: Cuba Polls 1997-2016 by Poll Year (Sample Size and Margin of Error +/-)
Source: FIU Cuba Poll: 1997-2016
 
Variables
7 Based on the theoretical frameworks which hypothesize distinctive world views based on
distance from the foundation event (Sewell W., 2005), generation, (Mannheim K, 1952;
Eckstein S., 2009) and wave (Grenier G., 2006), the present work analyses the results of the
1997-2016 Cuba Polls to explore the change over time of opinions on US/Cuba policy
among  different  generations  and  waves  of  Cuban  American  migrants  living  in  the
Metropolitan Miami Area. 
 
Dependent Variables
8 We focus on the core attitudinal variables asked in all of our polls: 1) support for the
embargo;  2)  opposition to the establishment of  diplomatic relations;  3)  opposition to
unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba; 4) having traveled to Cuba; 5) opposition to
the selling of food to Cuba; and 6) opposition to selling medicines to Cuba. 
 
Independent variables 
9 Considerable research using independent FIU Cuba Polls has shown that more recent
immigration waves, as well as Cuban Americans not born on the island, are the least
supportive of some of the key components of the “exile ideology, although the individual
components have not been tested to see if they measure a unitary concept (Grenier G.,
2006; Girard C. and G. Grenier, 2008; Girard C. et. al. 2012). In this analysis we simplify the
waves,  based on previous research. We will  look at four waves:  1959-1979, 1980-1994,
1995-2004 and 2005-2016. To test the impact of “generations” on isolationist attitudes
toward the island, we compared the isolationist attitudes of Cubans born outside of Cuba
with those born in Cuba. Birth outside Cuba served as a rough indicator of the second
generation.
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Change Over Time: Moving Away from Revolution and
Exile
10 Before presenting the changes in the attitudes of the Cuban American population in the
last  twenty years,  it  is  important to conceptualize the importance of  the event from
which all attitudes stem: the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. All analyses of the
changing nature of Cuban American attitudes implicitly or explicitly give primacy to the
Revolution in shaping the nature of the Cuban migration and Cuban perspectives of the
homeland. Indeed, events in the homeland have served as the “push factor” for all of the
major migration waves of Cubans into a diasporic existence. The framework borrowed
from Pedraza-Bailey (1985) describes the varying characteristics of Cuban immigration as
the result of the “changing phases of the Cuban revolution” (Pedraza-Bailey S., 1985: 4).
The  abrupt  structural  changes  initiated  by  the  Revolution  during  its  early  phases
transformed  the  society  and  were  eventually  institutionalized  into  the  bureaucratic
operations of  the  nation-state.  Both  the  processes  of  restructuring  and  those  of
bureaucratization had differential influences on the shaping of the migrant “vintages.”
The “waves” frame utilized by Grenier and collaborators implies changes in U.S. policy
and events in Cuba which stimulate the opening and closing of the migratory “faucet”
(Perez L., 1992). Early migrations are motivated by the Revolutionary restructuring of the
Cuban socioeconomic environment and subsequent waves are motivated by events that
facilitated  departures  or  easier  arrivals  to  the  United  States.  Similarly,  the  three
historical generations analyzed by Eckstein are associated with three significant events in
revolutionary  Cuba:  the  Revolution itself,  the  Mariel  Boatlift,  and the  Special  Period
brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
11 The importance of events in the continued migration of Cubans to the United States can
be framed by utilizing the lens of social historians. Social historians place great emphasis
on the importance of  the ‘event’  in shaping the lives and life chances of  individuals
experiencing  it.  Events  are  not  just  out  of  the  ordinary  happenings  that  draw  our
attention. The World Cup is an event, as is the birthing of a Royal baby, but they are not
the  types  of  occurrences  that  social  historians  consider  to  be  of  eventful  social
significance. Events,  for  historians,  are  social  occurrences  which  “transform  social
relations”  (Sewell  W.,  2005:  8).  In  Sewell’s  words,  “…when  historians  argue  for  the
importance  of  events,  they  have  in  mind  occurrences  that  have  momentous
consequences, that in some sense “change the course of history” by transforming social
structures and the institutions which stabilize social rituals and relationships (Sewell W.,
2005:  200,  226).  Such  transformations  unleash  a  chain  of  occurrences  that  durably
transforms previous structures and practices. In their transformation of social structures
(economy,  politics,  religion,  etc.),  events  establish  long  term  trends  which,  in  turn,
transform social relations over time and become the subject of social analysis. For social
historians “[time] is fateful. Time is irreversible in the sense that an action, once taken, or
an event once experienced cannot be obliterated. It is lodged in the memory of those
whom it affects and therefore irrevocably alters the situation in which it occurs. (Sewell
W., 2005: 7).
12 In our specific case, the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 is the foundation event
which  initiated  a  sequence  of  subsequent  events  which  shaped  the  motivations  and
options  of  migrants  during  specific  periods  since  1959.  The  first  cause  of  the
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contemporary migration flow from Cuba to the United States was the Cuban Revolution of
1959. This event transformed the political structures of Cuba overnight and continued to
restructure all of Cuban society for decades afterwards. The earliest of the migrants were
motivated to  leave their  homeland not  out  of  a  desire  to  start  new lives  in  a  more
promising sociocultural environment but out of fear that their lives would be negatively
affected by the new order. Although few imagined that they would never return to their
home, many of these earliest migrants considered themselves exiles and most suffered a
loss of property and a diminished quality of life in their transition to the new land. 
13 When we measure change over time, we are measuring change in attitudes in relation to
this foundation event. We should expect that measurements of attitudes most proximate
to the Triumph of the Revolution will express the harshest views against engaging the
State apparatuses emerging from the Revolution. Similarly, as we posit when we look at
the date by wave and generation,  those who left  the island as a direct  result  of  the
Revolution’s  triumph  will  hold  the  most  hostile  attitudes  towards  the  ensuing
government.  While  the  Revolution  was  the  first  cause  of  all  subsequent  events,  the
sequence of significant events made possible by the Revolution had an impact on the
migration flow between Cuba and the United States. 
 
Of Waves, Vintages and Generations
14 Three  frameworks  have  been utilized  over  the  years  to  explain  the emergence  of  a
patterned ideological diversity within the community; the continuous flows of Cubans to
the  U.S.  have  been  characterized  as  belonging  to  different  “vintages,”  “waves,”  and
“generations.” In one of the earliest attempts to frame the Cuban migration in a context
which recognizes its diversity, Pedraza-Bailey (1985) invokes the concept of “vintages” of
migrants, formulated by Kunz (1973) to frame the causal forces shaping the differences
evident in Cubans living in the U.S. at the time of her writing. The concept of “vintages”
was  formulated  by  Kunz  as  the  foundation  of  a  theory  of  refugee  migration  which
recognized a distinction between refugee migrations that occur as immediate responses
to structural  changes  and those that  respond to  changes  that  take a  longer  time to
develop. As the sociopolitical situation changes during times of crisis in a country, groups
of individuals will respond differently to the changes. “As the political situation ripens for
each, they leave the country as distinct ‘vintages’ each usually convinced of the moral
and political rightness of his actions and implicitly or openly blaming those who departed
earlier or stayed on.” (Kunz E. F., 1973: 137). These “vintages” of immigrants are distinct
in “character,  background,  and avowed political  faith (Kunz E.F.,  1973:  137;  Pedraza-
Bailey, 1985: 4).
15 Grenier and collaborators,  using the data from the FIU Cuba Poll,  have explored the
primacy of waves of departure in establishing the attitudinal patterns of Cuban émigrés
to the United States. The “waves” are determined by significant changes in the migration
flows between the two countries. Most analyses utilize the waves established by Grenier
(2006)  of  eight  cohorts:  1919-1958,  1959-1964,  1965-1973,  1974-1979,  1980,  1981-1989,
1990-1995,  and  1996-2004  (Girard  C.  and  G.  Grenier,  2008).  The  earlier  departures
consistently express  more support  for  the U.S.  policies  which isolate and attempt to
destabilize the Cuban government while the most recent arrivals consistently hold more
conciliatory views (Grenier G., 2006). This pattern has been maintained since the poll’s
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inception in 1991 although the variance between the earliest and most recent arrivals has
increased over the years (Grenier G. and H. Gladwin, 2014). 
16 Eckstein  (2009)  utilizes  an  adapted  version  of  Mannheim’s conceptualization  of
“generations”  to  identify  three  significant  migration  periods  which  shaped  the
characteristics  of  the  Cuban immigrants:  the  period covering  the  Revolution and its
aftermath produced the Exile émigré; the exodus authorized from the port of Mariel in
1980 produced the Marielitos; and the economic crisis resulting from the dissolution of
the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991 gave rise to the migration of the “New” Cubans.
These  three  migrations  cohorts  represent  three  different  “meaningful  generational
experiences”  that  differentiate  the  immigrants  from each  other  in  the  new country
(Eckstein S., 2009: 39). Using the frequency data from various FIU Cuba Polls, Eckstein
notes the different attitudes towards US/Cuba policy among the different waves of Cuban
migrants and second generation (born in US) Cuban Americans. The New Cubans and the
Second Generation are more likely to hold views encouraging engagement between the
nation states as well as between individual Cubans. The political motivations of the early
migrants,  self-described  as  Exiles,  are  not  shared  by  later  waves  of  migrants.  The
economic  factors  influencing  and  often  determining  the  migration  decisions  of  the
Cubans leaving the island after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union did not serve as
motivators  for  the  early  arrivals.  “With  different  pasts,  the  different  émigré  waves
arrived with different perspectives on life in general  and towards their  homeland in
particular.” (Eckstein S., 2009: 3). 
 
Data Presentation and Results
Change Over Time
17 Figures 4 through 7 show the variables by poll date. The trends are clear. There is a
general shift in the Cuban American population towards a more conciliatory approach to
dealing with Cuba. The position of isolation is slowly turning into a great support for
engagement with the island’s socioeconomic and political structures. 
18 From the slight majority of fifty-six percent in 1997, support for the sale of medicines to
Cuba increased to eighty-six percent by 2016. Similarly, the increase of support for the
sale of food products doubled (40.8%/80.8%) in twenty years (Figure 4).
 
Engage or Isolate? Twenty years of Cuban Americans’ Changing Attitudes toward...
IdeAs, 10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018
7
Figure 4: Support for Sale of Food and Medicine
FIU Cuba Poll: 1997-2016
19 An increase in the desire for engagement can be seen in the trends associated with two
other variables: the desire to make travel to Cuba available to all Americans and having
traveled to Cuba. In 1997, only thirty percent of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County
supported a policy of unrestricted travel to Cuba for all Americans. By 2016, over seventy-
three percent expressed support for this policy change. The frequency of travel by Cuban
Americans also increased during the two decades. Only twenty-three percent of Cuban
Americans had traveled to Cuba by 1997. This rose to forty-five percent by 2016. (Figure 5)
 
Figure 5: Support for Unrestricted Travel and Have Traveled to Cuba
FIU Cuba Poll: 1997-2016
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20 On the diplomatic front, after a keen interest expressed in the 2000 poll for establishing
diplomatic relations, presumably due to the tensions associated with the Elián González
affair, the policy lost support but again became the preference of the majority in 2007. By
2016, a year after the establishment of relations on July 20, 2015, sixty-nine percent of
Cuban  Americans  approved  of  the  policy  change.  The  expressed  opposition  to  the
embargo mirrors this trend. Opposition to the embargo was weak back in 1997 when only
twenty-two percent of the Cuban American population opposed the long-standing policy.
The latest poll reflected the changes in attitudes within the population as sixty-three
percent opposed the continuation of the embargo (Figure 6).
 
Figure 6: Support for Diplomatic Relations and Opposition to Embargo
Source: FIU Cuba Poll: 1997-2016
21 The  trend  in  the  key  variables  presented  is  clear.  The  general  population  of  Cuban
Americans in Miami Dade County has undergone a transition from a population resisting
engagement with Cuba to one interested in more engagement. Now let us review the data
based on time of departure from Cuba and generation.
 
Change by Waves and Generations
22 Table 1 shows the percentage of Cuban Americans supporting the hardline isolationist
policies, broken down for the four major waves and by generation (whether born in Cuba
or not). The table shows a considerable gap between the weak support for engagement
policies in the first post-revolutionary waves (1959-1979) and the highest level of support
in the last wave (2005-2016). The attitudes of the Second Generation tend to align with
the more engagement conscious attitudes of the last two waves. 
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Table 1: Support for Isolationist Policies for Entire Combined Samples Percentage Supporting


















Generations:       
Not  Cuba
Born
48.9% 69.9% 60.7% 19.9% 72.2% 78.2%
Waves:       
1959-1979 26.1% 38.6% 32.3% 26% 41.9% 58.1%
1980-1994 43.3% 57.9% 53.2% 41.6% 62.7% 70.8%
1995-2004 58% 73.8% 77.5% 49.4% 80.3% 87.3%
2005-2016 70.5% 89.5% 87.4% 35.1% 89.9% 91.3%
FIU Cuba Poll, 1997-2016
23 Figures 7 through 9 present the trends—clearly towards engagement—exhibited by the
most recent waves of migrants. Support for sales of food and medicine trended strongly
towards a support for more engagement among the most recently arrived cohorts of
migrants.  Those arriving during the first  two decades after  the Revolution are more
supportive of selling medicine than food (58% to 42%) but the arrivals during the last two
decades express a near consensus of support for selling both items to Cubans on the
island.
 
Engage or Isolate? Twenty years of Cuban Americans’ Changing Attitudes toward...
IdeAs, 10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018
10
Figure 7: Support for Sales of Food and Medicine by Wave and Generation
FIU Cuba Poll: 1997-2016
 
Figure 8: Support for Unrestricted Travel and Have Traveled to Cuba
FIU Cuba Poll: 1997-2016
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Figure 9: Support for Diplomatic Relations and Embargo
FIU Cuba Poll: 1997-2016
24 On the travel front, a minority of those leaving Revolutionary Cuba during the first two
decades  (32%)  support  the  opening  of  unrestricted  travel to  all  Americans  while  a
staggering eighty-seven percent of those leaving Cuba during the last decade support this
change in policy. While a minority of Cubans have traveled to the island in all arrival
cohorts, we can stipulate a difference in motivation, or lack thereof, between the earliest
wave and the latter one to explain the low travel frequency. The earliest group have the
resources and are not restricted from traveling to the island while the latter group is the
poorest  of  the  waves  and,  if  they  left  illegally,  might  face  restrictions  to  return.
Predictably, fewer Second Generation Cuban Americans have traveled to the island but a
sizable majority (61%) support unrestricted travel by all Americans. 
25 The establishment of  diplomatic relations is  supported by ninety-percent of  the new
arrivals  but  by  less  than  thirty-nine  percent  of  1959-1979  migrants.  Similarly,  only
twenty-six percent of 1959-1979 arrivals oppose the continuation of the embargo while
over seventy-percent of those arriving during the last decade express opposition to the
embargo.
26 In general, there is low support for the isolationist policies among Cubans not born in
Cuba. This is evidence for the generational segmentation hypothesized in the literature.
This is consistent with the expectation of less support for isolationist policies from those
born and socialized outside the world transformed by the Cuban revolution. Even the
embargo, which has strong majority support from the wave representing the parental
generation, receives support of approximately fifty percent of the diaspora generation
Cuban Americans. While the embargo as a symbolic form of political identity has a strong
tradition in the Cuban American community, the symbolism of this policy (Girard C. et. al.,
2010) is losing its impact on the U.S. born Cuban Americans. 
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Discussion 
27 An identity as exiles has colored all aspects of the life of Cubans in the United States. It
has resulted in an inordinate allocation of resources, including emotional energy, towards
the primary task of reclaiming the homeland; it has shaped the social life of the Cuban
American community and the focus of its voluntary associations; it has reinforced a sense
of exceptionalism, setting them apart from other immigrant and Latino groups; it has
made the relationship with the government of the homeland a perennially conflictive
one; it has determined the nature of their participation in the political life of the new
country. In short, the condition of exile has defined the purpose of the community and its
reason for being here, and it is the condition that has largely shaped the image most
Americans have of them.
28 If indeed exile has defined the condition of Cubans in the United States, then the biggest
issue as we look toward the future is what will happen when they are no longer exiles.
That is, what will this group look like when the entire context that has shaped their very
identity changes dramatically? The research presented here, as well as the overall trends
evident in other research utilizing the FIU Cuba Poll begins to answer this question.
29 When we are speaking of the Cuban American community in Miami, we are speaking of a
group whose contemporary migration flow to the United States, and particularly to the
South Florida region, is past the half  century mark in its duration. That flow can be
categorized into event driving migration waves, each with different push factors. These
various cohorts have been progressively increasing the socioeconomic and ideological
heterogeneity of the community. Also, a growing number of the members of the Cuban
American community were not born in Cuba. If we refer to the Cuban immigrants to the
Miami area as being composed of waves, the increasing number of U.S. born Cubans are
the rising tide. 
30 The research shows us the combination of ways that the post-exile identity of Cuban
Americans is developing. One is through a generational transition as new generations,
born in the United States, come of age. The other is through a fundamental change in the
relationship with the homeland which is manifested through a demographic change in
the diasporic community. The new arrivals have a different relation with the homeland
and they continue to come to the Miami area. Over 500,000 Cubans have received Lawful
Permanent Residence in the United States since 2000. (Figure 10) We estimate that over
60 percent of these new arrivals have settled in the south Florida area. These are not the
displaced elites and others marked by the political confrontation of the early 1960s. These
are mostly economic migrants who, although well  educated, are leaving an economic
condition that does not make use of their human resources. Their commitment to the
“exile agenda” is more tenuous.
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Figure 10: Cubans Obtaining Lawful Permanente Residence (2000-2015)
2015 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 2, Department of Homeland
Security.
31 Seventeen years into the 21st Century, the growth of the U.S.-born and the arrival of new
waves have combined with mortality to whittle  down the proportion of  early exiles.
Those arriving from 1960 to 1964 and during the Airlift barely accounted for a fourth of
all Cubans in the United States in 2016.
32 Another  way  things  are  changing,  and  dramatically,  is  the  transformation  in  the
relationship with the homeland by the United States. The establishment of diplomatic
relations and the trend towards increasing trade and travel, even with the embargo still
in place, as well as the economic and immigration changes put in place by the Cuban
government, have weakened the exile’s ideological opposition to engagement. The death
of Fidel Castro has “depersonalized” the conflict as well. The exile ideology has a strong
oppositional nature. It cannot be sustained without its nemesis. For the new arrivals and
the second generation, the identity of the “nemesis” is not clear.
33 In general  terms,  the attitudes of  Cuban Americans towards the islands have been a
result, in part, of the policies of the United States towards Cuba which, since the early
1960s until December 17, 2014, have been designed with the intent of isolating the Cuban
nation  and  preventing  U.S.  citizens  and  institutions  from  establishing  any  kind  of
relations with individuals or organizations in Cuba. The ultimate goal of the isolationist
policies at their inception was to promote regime change and undercut the sustainability
of the Cuban Revolutionary government (LeoGrande W. and P. Kornbluh, 2015). For many
decades  it  was  assumed  that  the  Cuban  American  community  in  the  United  States,
particularly its  members living in the Cuban enclave of  South Florida,  supported the
isolationist purpose of the policies (Perez L.,  1992). A more nuanced picture of Cuban
American public opinion began to emerge in the 1990s as the FIU Cuba Poll established a
reliable and continuing measure of Cuban American attitudes towards US/Cuba relations.
34 In this article I present data which quantify the changing attitudes of the Cuban American
population in Miami-Dade County.  Any synthesis  of  the ideological  tendencies of  the
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Cuban  American  community  in  Florida  leads  to  the  same  conclusion:  demographic
changes are driving the ideological changes of the Cuban community in Miami. This is
important because the trends could signal the end of the tendency to see the community
as  ideologically  monolithic  and  uncompromising,  and  the  emergence  of  the  "new
ideology of  diaspora" directed at  establishing and maintaining relationships with the
island. If it is true that the ideology of the earlier emigres has exerted a major influence
not only in the development of an immigrant community, but also on the foreign policy
of the United States, the bearers of the more recent arrivals, the new ideology, will wield
similar power. 
35 Not only will the new arrivals influence decisions made in Washington about US/Cuba
relations, but given their changing sociopolitical profile,  new pan-ethnic alliances are
made possible. The vast majority of Cubans in the United States are no longer exiles. The
“exile ideology” (Grenier G.  and Perez L.,  2003) is weakening.  The profile of the new
Cubans is moving closer to that of other U.S. immigrant groups in terms of their political,
social,  and economic  agenda.  There  will  probably  be a  greater  cultural  and political
integration with other Latino groups. There are already indications that the pan-ethnic
labels so vehemently rejected by the first generation have made inroads among Cuban
Americans born in this country. The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study found
that among the Cuban-origin children in senior high school in Miami,  thirty percent
identified  as  “Hispanic”  or  “Latino”  (Perez  L.,  2001:  107-108).  An  Hispanic  or  Latino
identity is not derived from their parents. Virtually none of those children indicated that
their  Cuban-born  parents  identified  as  anything  other  than  “Cuban.”  Similarly,
exploratory research has shown, for example, that Cubans share with other Latinos in the
State  of  Florida  an  interest  in  maintaining  and  expanding  the  health  care  coverage
introduced in the Affordable Health Care Act (Aysa-Lastra M., et. al. 2014). This and other
areas of cooperation with Latino populations throughout the State are made possible by
the ongoing diversification of the Cuban American population.
36 The “new ideology of the diaspora” will  also contribute to the normalization process
recently initiated by the Obama/Castro administrations. The new arrivals are the growth
sector of the Miami-Dade community and these are the Cuban Americans whose lives
have been most significantly shaped by the Cuban reality; a reality governed not by the
élan and suffering brought about by Revolutionary change but by the daily struggles of a
poor Latin American country ninety miles away from the country with the strongest
economy; its most influential neighbor for the last one hundred and fifty years. For better
or worse.
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ABSTRACTS
This article traces, for the first time, the changes in the opinions of Cuban Americans in South
Florida on the topic of U.S./Cuba relations during the last twenty years using the FIU Cuba Poll as
the data base. The analysis traces the changes in key variables from 1997 until the most recent
poll  concluded  in  August  of  2016.  These  years  marked  the  decades  with  the  most  intense
migration  of  Cubans  to  the  United  States  since  the  triumph of  the  Revolution.  The  analysis
details  how  Cuban  immigrants  during  this  time  relate  to  the  island  in  material  terms
(remittances, investments, travel), and in ideological terms (attitudes towards maintaining the
embargo, political ideology, etc.). Seven FIU Cuba Poll have been combined to present a broad
vision of the changes in Cuban American political culture in South Florida. We find that it is not
only the newcomers who want a rapprochement with their homeland, but the second and third
generations of Cuban Americans also want more engagement. 
El presente trabajo por primera vez traza los cambios de opiniones hacia Cuba por los Cubanos en
el sur de la Florida durante los últimos veinte años; desde el 1997 hasta la más reciente encuesta,
Agosto  2016.  Estos  años  marcan las  décadas  con la  más  intensa  migración  de  cubanos  a  los
Estados Unidos desde el triunfo de la Revolución. La presentación detalla cómo estos inmigrantes
se  relacionan con la  isla  en términos materiales  (remesas,  inversiones,  viajes),  y  también en
términos ideológicos (actitudes hacia  el  mantenimiento del  embargo,  ideología  política,  etc.).
Siete encuestas del  FIU Cuba Poll  se han combinado para presentar una visión amplia de los
cambios en la cultura política del cubano-americano en el sur de la Florida. Encontramos que no
solo son los recién llegados que desean un acercamiento con su patria, pero que muchos de los
miembros de la segunda y tercera generación también desean un acercamiento con la isla.
Cet article retrace,  pour la première fois,  l’évolution des opinions des Cubains-Américains de
Floride du Sud à propos des relations entre les Etats-Unis et Cuba durant les vingt dernières
années, en utilisant les sondages de la Florida International University comme base de données,
depuis 1997 jusqu’au sondage le plus récent conduit en août 2016. Ces années ont été marquées
par la plus forte migration de Cubains vers les Etats-Unis depuis le triomphe de la révolution.
Nous analysons le lien des immigrés cubains avec l’île en termes matériels (transferts d’argent/
remittances, investissements, voyages) et en termes idéologiques (attitude à l’égard de l’embargo,
idéologie politique, etc.). Sept sondages FIU ont été compilés pour présenter un large panorama
des  changements  dans  la  culture  politique  des  Cubains-Américains en Floride  du Sud.  Notre
analyse  démontre  que  ce  ne  sont  pas  seulement  les  nouveaux  venus  qui  souhaitent  un
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rapprochement  avec  l’île  mais  également  les  deuxième  et  troisième  générations  de  citoyens
américains d’origine cubaine.
INDEX
Keywords: Cuban Americans, transition, ideological changes, demographic changes, migrations
Palabras claves: Cubano Americanos, Transición, cambios ideológicos, cambios demográficos,
migraciones
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